Middle East risk spotlights Europe’s critical minerals exposure—and the limits of current plans

As geopolitical stress rises around the Gulf of Hormuz, Europe’s critical-minerals agenda is facing a sharper test than policy documents suggest. The concern is not only about headline energy prices, but about second- and third-order disruptions to mineral supply chains that underpin both industrial production and defence readiness.

Michael Wurmser, founder of London-based mining services firm Norge Mineraler, warns that Europe’s dependence on imports leaves it exposed when shipping routes tighten or production constraints spread. He points in particular to sulphur, describing it as a crucial input for copper and cobalt extraction, and says the region’s vulnerability can quickly translate into higher costs and reduced availability for downstream industries.

Sulphur bottlenecks show how fast risks travel

The Gulf currently supplies around 25% of global sulphur output, largely as a byproduct of oil refining. Since conflict in Iran began, sulphur prices have surged—rising 25% recently and reaching levels 165% higher year-on-year—according to the account cited by Wurmser. The same pressures are compounded by shipping constraints and what the article describes as a selective blockade affecting passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

Wurmser frames this as an example of why mineral security cannot be treated as a standalone issue. “While Brent crude dominates headlines, the second- and third-order effects on critical minerals are equally consequential,” he says.

The EU’s targets may not match strategic needs

The European Union’s approach is embodied in its 10-40-50 plan, which sets goals for 2030: extracting 10% of Europe’s mineral needs, completing 40% refining within the continent, and recycling 25%. Yet Wurmser argues these targets are insufficient relative to what he calls strategic requirements.

He urges policymakers to look inward at resources already beneath European soil, citing minerals including phosphorus alongside linked references to lithium, manganese, graphite, and copper. In his view, Europe’s current approach remains fragmented—“disparate at best,” potentially “negligent at worst”—and does not adequately address long-term supply assurance.

A case for vertical integration after supply-chain shocks

The argument extends beyond sourcing. Wurmser links today’s exposure to lessons from recent disruptions: he notes that since the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war, global supply chains have shown how fragile they can be under stress. His prescription is for vertically integrated systems spanning extraction, processing, and end-use—especially where continuity matters most, including defence applications and food production.

In that framing, relying on global markets during periods of tension becomes both economically inefficient and strategically risky. He says “scrambling for scarce resources on the global market” is neither an economic nor a security strategy, adding that Europe should invest in domestic extraction and refining to insulate itself from future disruptions.

If action stalls, costs could compound across budgets and industry

The article outlines potential consequences if Europe does not move faster: billions in lost tax revenue; millions of tonnes of untapped minerals; and rising prices driven by Iran’s influence over the Hormuz corridor. Wurmser concludes that reclaiming control over resources beneath Europe—not simply depending on external markets—is central to sustaining both industrial capability and military future planning.