Central Asia’s Tungsten Push Puts Pressure on China’s Critical-Mineral Grip

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are moving from peripheral producers to potential pillars of the global tungsten market, at a moment when governments and investors are reassessing concentration risk. The shift is being driven by a combination of surging prices, heightened geopolitical scrutiny, and China’s tightening export controls—factors that have turned tungsten into a boardroom-level supply-chain question rather than a niche commodity.

Tungsten’s strategic importance is already embedded in policy frameworks. It is used across defense systems, aerospace alloys, cutting tools, and semiconductor applications manufacturing. In December 2024, NATO designated tungsten as one of 12 defense-critical raw materials, while the United States placed it among “highest-risk” minerals in its 2025 Critical Minerals list.

Concentration remains the baseline—and prices reflect it

The starting point for any diversification effort is stark. In 2024, China produced more than 80% of mined tungsten. By contrast, the US has not mined tungsten domestically since 2015, relying on imports and recycling to meet demand.

Market signals have intensified this imbalance. Ammonium Paratungstate (APT) climbed from roughly $340 per metric ton in early 2025 to above $1,100 in early 2026—an escalation that has made new project pipelines in Central Asia harder to ignore.

Two-track development: Western-backed expansion versus established Chinese investment

Central Asia has become a proving ground for non-Chinese production capacity Kazakhstan. A US-backed joint venture is targeting the Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty deposits—described as among the world’s largest undeveloped tungsten resources. The initiative is supported by the US Export-Import Bank and the International Development Finance Corporation, with an ambition to supply 15% of global output. First production is expected by 2029, subject to approvals.

China’s footprint is already operational. Jiaxin International Resources Investment—majority-owned by Jiangxi Copper—commercialized the Bakuta open-pit mine in 2025, producing 3.3 million tonnes of tungsten ore. Kazakhstan’s proximity to China and relatively stable policy conditions have helped make it an attractive base for Chinese investors.

Uzbekistanis also accelerating its efforts through both mining activity and industrial policy. The Turkish-owned K-Tungsten project in Uzbekistan’s Navoiy region has drilled more than 60,000 meters since mid-2025 and targets first production in 2028. Separately, Uzbekistan revised subsoil legislation, prioritized strategic minerals, and launched a Technological Metals Complex designed to encourage local processing and deeper integration into global markets. By 2030, Uzbekistan’s share of global tungsten extraction could rise toward nearly 15%, compared with just 0.005% in 2025.

The investor logic: securing supply without matching China everywhere

The competitive dynamic between Washington and Beijing plays out differently depending on where value sits along the chain. Cove Capital CEO Pini Althaus said that while the US cannot replicate China’s dominance in processing at scale quickly enough to offset everything else, securing Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s tungsten matters for diversifying supply chains.

Chinese perspectives emphasize different fundamentals: Hugo Qiu highlighted Kazakhstan’s political stability, abundant resources, and relationships with China alongside ties with both the US and Russia as advantages for investors. From Uzbekistan’s standpoint, Temur Zokirov framed openness as a deliberate strategy—stating that Uzbekistan is open to all investors, selecting partners on a first-come-first-served basis while building local processing capacity.

What could slow progress—and what would still be achieved if it succeeds

The path from resource development to reliable supply is not automatic. Projects face multiple constraints:

• Harsh winters and infrastructure constraints could delay production timelines.
• Capital expenditure escalation, particularly for drilling-intensive programs.
• ESG compliance and cross-border political dynamics, which must be managed even for advanced Chinese-backed operations.

Even so, upside remains meaningful if execution holds. If Kazakhstan captures a meaningful portion of non-Chinese tungsten supply—and if Uzbekistan expands both mining and processing—Central Asia could provide a substantial share of global tungsten within a decade. That outcome would not eliminate China’s role but could reshape how buyers manage risk across their sourcing portfolios.

Taken together, these initiatives suggest that Central Asia’s tungsten projects are becoming more than industrial ventures—they are tests of how resource-rich states can leverage strategic mineral status alongside policy support and foreign capital to gain influence over critical supply chains. With Western buyers increasingly willing to pay premiums for secure diversification beyond single-source dependence manufacturing, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan may have an opening to help redraw the wider global tungsten map.